Continued
Redissi then went on to elaborate the ideological, cultural, economic, social, and political aspects of the Islamic exception. With regard to ideology, Redissi said that Islam has not been able to surpass the temptation to fundamentalism, which has wavered over the past two and a half centuries between jihad (struggle, both internally and against impious Muslims), limited-scale holy war (against non-believers), and planetary holy war (as embodied by Osama bin Laden's calls to kill Westerners).
Moving on to culture, Redissi contrasted Islamic civilization with Japanese civilization to highlight the stark differences in the way each has been able to adapt to changing circumstances. The Japanese have adopted a model of “co-habitation,” remaining faithful to their traditional values while becoming technologically modern. Islamic civilization, on the other hand, has tended toward synthesis in the form of an “Islamicization of modernity.” However, Redissi noted, it is impossible to synthesize the modern into the medieval and thus Islam has become a prisoner of its own model.
Redissi held that the predominance of tribal societies throughout Islamic history has created economic and social exceptions. Many Islamic societies were tribal well into the 20th century, which hindered the advance of capitalism within these lands. Likewise, absent a strong middle class — historically a driver of change — Islamic societies have tended to remain fractious and susceptible to authoritarian rule.
Redissi noted that the political exception stems from the lack of secularism in the majority of Islamic societies (with the notable exception of Turkey). Whereas the Protestant Reformation encouraged a clear delineation between church and state in the West, there has been no similar reformation in Islam, and political systems within most Islamic countries continue to be dominated by religious tenets.
In conclusion, Redissi affirmed that Islam is indeed compatible with modernity, but that it is the responsibility of Muslims to break with the characteristics that have created the Islamic exception and to encourage new interpretations of Islam that will enable Muslims to be faithful to their religion and productive citizens of an increasingly globalized planet.
Following the three panelists’ presentations, the floor was opened to questions from the audience. The first question asked whether there exist centers of research exist in the Muslim world at which thinkers work to reinterpret the Qur'an. Abdelmajid Charfi responded that although researchers with modern training who are interested in “Islamic sciences” are rare in the Muslim world, Tunisia is an exception. In Tunisia, teams of researchers composed mainly of young thinkers with good knowledge of Islamic texts and modern methodologies approach questions of scriptural and historical interpretation. The study of religion is taught as a human science in Tunisia, whereas elsewhere it is approached as a dogmatic science and is considered the purview of 'ulema. Boutheina Cheriet added that some individual research on improving the condition of women in Islam is being done by scholars in Morocco, but that there are no real centers and no systematic approach to the discipline. She reminded the audience that most Muslims live in authoritarian states and that any attempts toward democratization are closely monitored.
The second question asked how fundamentalism in the Muslim world can be defeated. Abdelmajid Charfi replied that he and his colleagues were not equipped with the political power to conquer fundamentalism. The fight against fundamentalism must begin upstream, he said, by offering youth a credible alternative. The new interpretations of Islam that are conceived by scholars in universities must be introduced into the educational systems through textbooks and curricular reforms.
A third question was posed about the ideology of the Islamist group FIS in Algeria. Hamadi Redissi replied first, maintaining that FIS cannot move away from the idea that the state is responsible for upholding religion. Although he insisted that religion should remain in the private sphere, the concept of separation of church and state does not exist in the Muslim world, he said. Rather, Muslims talk of a more subtle “distinction” between religion and political and civil life. Boutheina Cheriet added that it was never clear to what extent Algerians actually supported FIS, which attempted to gain power through democratic means in the early 1990s.* Youcef Yousfi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations and a guest at the roundtable, interjected that, had FIS come to power, there would no longer be an Algerian state today.
The fourth question considered whether Islam itself can be blamed for the deficit of democracy in the Muslim world, given the lack of democracy in non-Islamic regions like Central America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Hamadi Redissi answered that the failures of democracy are linked to the colonial experience, which weighed heavily on the Muslim world; his book, in fact, begins with the arrival of Napoleon in Egypt. While there are many variables affecting systems of government, a common variable throughout the Muslim world is Islam. Redissi acknowledged that there are different “types” of Islam — some of which may be considered more conducive to democracy than others — yet when a positive comment is made about Islam few distinctions are demanded.
Abdelmajid Charfi insisted that distinctions should be made on three levels. First, there is the Quranic level — the level of the message — which is open to infinite interpretations. Second, there is the level of historical practice, which has differed widely from state to state and which can be submitted to analysis. Finally, there is the personal level whereby each Muslim carves out a unique vision or practice of Islam.
A fifth audience member offered that the challenge of modernity is not confronting Islam, the religion, but rather Islamic societies and states. This questioner compared the panelists to a doctor who has offered a diagnosis of a problem (reconciling Islam with modernity), but has not suggested a course of treatment. If some of the major Islamic states — Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, for example — were to form an economic union, would this spark changes in Muslim societies that would reverse the symptoms? Mustapha Tlili referred the question to Abdul Wahab, Ambassador and Permanent Observer of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to the United Nations and present among the guests, who responded that this is precisely what the D8 (Developing Eight) countries of the OIC have sought to do. The D8 members — Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey — have sought to cooperate on trade and economic issues to improve their countries' welfare and economies.
The final question was whether there is something intrinsic to Christianity that enabled the West to become a model of modernization for the Muslim world. Likewise, should Muslim women strive to emulate women in the West even though religious values in the West seem to be in decline? Hamadi Redissi was the first to reply, stating that the West, modernity, and democracy are all part of a common heritage. Boutheina Cheriet responded to the second question, maintaining that it is offensive to say that the emancipation of women would lead to the decay of religious values. The problem for Muslims, she said, is that most are stuck living under authoritarian political regimes, and this is what should cause them concern.
Ed Berenson then brought the evening to a close, with thanks to panelists, the sponsors, and the assembled guests.
* Algeria adopted a new constitution in 1989, which wrested power from the FLN (National Liberation Front), the party that had dominated the country since independence in 1962, and established a multi-party democracy. In the first national elections that were contested under the new constitution in December 1991, the Islamist FIS party, formed in 1989, won a majority of votes in the first cycle of voting. Faced with a likely FIS victory in the conclusive round of voting, the military intervened, postponing the subsequent elections and disbanding the National Assembly. This touched off a civil war between FIS and the secular Algerian military, which has resulted in more than 100,000 deaths since 1992. In 1996 a referendum on the constitution was passed that banned Islamist parties in Algeria.
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