Who Speaks for Islam? Who Speaks for the West?
continued
Mustapha Tlili then posed a question to the next panelist, Ambassador Fernando Valenzuela, asking him why the EU is hesitant to admit Turkey. Is the explanation cultural? Historic? Economic? Social?
Ambassador Valenzuela began by denying any hesitance on the part of the EU, as an organization. He stressed that EU decisions with regard to Turkey have not been improvised. He suggested rather that Turkey and the EU had not been synchronized until 2004, when Turkey became a negotiating candidate after having sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria.
Valenzuela stressed that the EU is not simply an intergovernmental organization; it is an integration process that cannot be improvised. When a state becomes a member, it embeds itself in a network of institutions and surrenders a certain degree of sovereignty.
While denying that the EU itself is hesitant to admit Turkey, Valenzuela acknowledged that there is a sentiment of hesitancy on the part of EU member states toward Turkey’s admission. He attributed this to general problems facing Europe that affect Turkish candidacy—enlargement fatigue, globalization, challenges to the welfare state, new secular challenges—rather than anything specific to Turkey. Europe is facing a crisis, he said, and without a clear way forward it will be difficult to resolve these lingering issues. Over the last ten years European integration has been a process of deepening and widening. But the recent enlargement (adding twelve new member states since 2004) has taken place without deepening, a factor contributing to the European crisis.
Valenzuela then addressed some specific issues related to Turkey that have been cited as obstacles to Turkish accession:
- Size. While some would argue that Turkey is too big for the EU, Valenzuela suggested that this perceived difficulty could actually be an advantage. With regard to energy, for example, Turkey’s size and strategic location make it an important hub for the distribution of energy to Europe.
- Income level. Some say that Turkey is too poor and would require too much economic support from the rest of Europe. However, the Turkish economy has been growing at a formidable rate of 7-9% per year over the last few years. Turkey’s per capita income has more than doubled in the last four years. If the horizon for negotiations is 10-15 years, with this growth rate, will too poor still be an issue, Valenzuela asked? He warned that it is a mistake to project certain difficulties of today forward to the time when negotiations are finished, as many of today’s problems will be resolved by then.
- Culture. To those who say that Turkey is too different, Valenzuela recalled Spain’s tourist slogan from the 1960s, “Spain is different.” Difference is a matter of perception that changes over time, he said. Although Spain was different from other large European countries in the 1960s, Spain today is one of the most vibrant and most successful states in Europe. If Turkey’s improvements continue in a sustained permanent manner, many of today’s perceived differences will no longer exist. He was careful to note, however, that religion is an important difference. He added that EU citizens will have to learn to live with other EU citizens who are Muslim.
Mustapha Tlili observed that the Turkish people are becoming impatient and frustrated by the uncertainty of Turkish accession. How long will they continue to wait, he asked Bahadir Kaleagasi. And who stands to gain the most from Turkish accession—Turkey or the rest of Europe?
Bahadir Kaleagasi responded that it is in the interest of Turkey, the EU and indeed the entire world for Turkey to gain entry to the EU. He called Turkish accession a “win, win, win” situation. He pointed out that there are many European leaders who are speaking in favor of Turkey in very clear terms. The president and vice president of the European Commission, for example, argue that Europe needs Turkey to be a global power. Other current heads of state support Turkish membership along the same lines.
The debate about different visions for the future that is occurring within the EU mirrors that occurring within Turkey, Kaleagasi said. He observed that there seems to be a strange alliance between “Turkophobes” in Europe and “Euroskeptics” in Turkey. He stressed that the Turkish Muslim community will continue to be a major driving force pushing Turkey to achieve the accession criteria, including becoming a better democracy and a more stable, open economy.
Kaleagasi agreed with Ambassador Valenzeula’s observation that the arguments launched against Turkey are often irrelevant in that Turkey will have already solved many of its perceived problems in order to fulfill EU membership criteria, something he believes Turkey can achieve in less than10 years.
But what kind of Europe would Turkey be joining in 10 years? He warned that Europe’s problems could become dangerous, in particular its economic stagnation and the growing trend in a number of countries of centrist parties adopting elements of the extreme right discourse. But Kaleagasi concluded on a more optimistic note, asserting his belief that conditions in both Europe and Turkey would be right for Turkish accession in the next few years, and that a worst-case scenario in Europe is unlikely.
Mustapha Tlili took the floor again and sought to put the previous panelists’ remarks into a global context. The Muslim world today is in search of its soul, he said. We see this every day in the form of strife, violence and fear. Turkey offers an alternative model of secular governance in an Islamic country—something that is unique in the history of Islam. Most analysts in the United States are in favor of Turkey’s admission to EU for this reason. He then turned to Steven Cook and asked him to comment on the implications of Turkish accession to the EU for the broader Muslim-Western relationship.
Steven Cook opened on a humorous note; the last speaker always has the advantage, he joked, of appropriating the wisdom of those before him and claiming it as his own. On a more serious note, he offered two caveats to the notion that Turkish accession could be a cure-all both for internal strife within the Muslim world and for tensions between the Muslim world and the West. First, he said, the idea that Turkish accession will affect grievances throughout the Muslim World puts a tremendous burden on both Turkey and the EU. Second, such reasoning treats Islam and the West as monolithic. Cook expressed his skepticism of the talk of a “Turkish model” for the Muslim world. The idea that a democratic, secular Turkey could become a part of the West is very appealing and warms the hearts of American policy makers. Indeed this sentiment is even echoed among some Muslims; he cited the example of an Egyptian liberal enthralled with Turkey’s reforms who has called for an Arab Ataturk to enforce secularization in the Arab world.
But Turkey is coming into its own both politically and diplomatically and is pursuing a more neutral foreign policy that seeks to build bridges with the Muslim world. The crosscurrents in Turkish society are evident; all at once Turkey is more Islamic, more European and more nationalist. It is unlikely, Cook concluded, that Turkish accession to the EU would have a decisive effect on the Muslim world—that, for example, it would change the way Arabs see the West in general. Divisive issues will remain. By contrast, if Turkey is rejected, the reaction from the Muslim world will be much more problematic, Cook warned. A discourse will develop (one that is already there) attributing Turkey’s rejection by the EU entirely to religion and culture—a reaffirmation of the clash of civilizations.
Cook agreed with Tony Judt’s assertion that the current European leadership lacks strategic vision with regard to Turkey’s membership. They fail to see that the message they are sending to the broader Islamic world is even more important than what happens to Turkey. That said, if Turkey is to gain membership to the EU, it should be because Turkey has merited it, and not because of the effect Turkey’s accession might have on the rest of the Muslim world.
Following Steven Cook’s remarks, the floor was opened to the audience for questions. Mustapha Tlili fielded a number of questions before turning to the panelists for their responses. The first set of questions concerned the lack of leadership that Tony Judt described in Europe. Is this a result of politicians responding to electorates fearful of having Turkey as a member, or, rather, are Europeans fearful of having Turks as residents of their own countries? Is skittishness about Turkey a reflection of the current fear of a larger Muslim presence in Europe?
The second question was posed by a correspondent from the Bulgarian news agency. She observed that while religion is not a pre-condition for Turkey’s membership in the EU, the resolution of the Cyprus question is. What is the sentiment in Turkey for compromise on this issue?
The third question posed was whether Turkey’s various ruling elements are on the same page about joining the EU. The audience member suggested that section 301 of the Turkish penal code, which makes it a crime to insult “Turkishness” and which has been used by the government to bring charges against Turks who speak out about the Armenian genocide and the Kurdish problem, reflects the government’s ambivalence toward protecting free speech.
1 The Copenhagen criteria are a set of political and economic criteria that define whether a country is eligible for membership in the EU. They derive their name from the June 1993 meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen, where they were adopted.
2Cyprus is an island country in the Mediterranean. Since 1974 it has been divided into two de facto autonomous zones, the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus, dominated by Greek Cypriots (but not recognized by Turkey), and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, dominated by Turkish Cypriots and recognized only by Turkey. Cyprus joined the EU as a divided country in 2004. In December 2006 the EU threatened a partial suspension of Turkish accession talks in response to Turkey’s refusal to open its ports and airports to vessels from Cyprus.
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U.S.–Muslim Engagement Project Report Published: “Changing Course: A New Direction for U.S. Relations with the Muslim World” September 24, 2008, at the National Press Club, Washington D.C.
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