2002 Report (Continued)
What does history tell us? Who controls historical memory and how is it used? The fifth plenary session discussed these questions and the various ways in which history is important to the Muslim-Western encounter. Panelists agreed that control over history is widely sought and, once obtained, is often used by social and political elites to maintain the status quo. On the other hand, memory is fleeting and history is continuously redefined as new events occur. It is a fallacy, for instance, to view Muslim history as frozen in a specific, earlier period, whether the Baghdad of the Abbasids or the Granada of the Nasrids. History is also important in showing that, in both the Islamic and Western worlds, there has been, throughout the ages, more cultural and religious diversity than is usually recognized. Although the panelists cautioned against overgeneralizing, some participants thought that the continuities in Muslim history needed to be noted; as opposed to the widespread vision of the Islamic past as long periods of warfare and instability punctuated by dynastic rule, history shows stable social and political patterns and consistent advances in knowledge. The session also put forward the view that there is a continuous and common historical process from which none can disengage and to which everyone contributes. This concept is significant, it was suggested, since it may help undermine the combative implications of the Clash of Civilizations approach and perhaps help lay the groundwork for greater understanding.
Richard Bulliet, 16 professor of history at Columbia University in New York City, discussed the political uses of history. He made the important points that neither can we know what will be remembered in the future nor can we determine who will decide what is historically significant. He illustrated this idea by recalling an event that occurred on September 11, 1901—the assassination of the American president, William McKinley. The New York Times published an article the day after his assassination remarking on the effect his death would have on later generations. The fact that very few people today are aware of this event shows how immediate perceptions do not always reflect the way things are remembered later on. Bulliet argued that although it would be inappropriate to say that lessons can be drawn from history, there are broad ideas that emerge from historical narratives. Perhaps most important, historical memory is fleeting and can be easily manipulated. Bulliett also suggested that schoolbooks are crucial to this process because they shape the attitudes of students, and one might even say indoctrinate the young. The Western perspective on Muslim societies could be improved by integrating them into the “master narrative” of world history. Students would benefit from revised history books taking a more integrative approach. Modern Western textbooks ignore, for instance, the enormous cultural and economic exchange between the southern and northern Mediterranean in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Instead, this period is portrayed as a time of great warfare between Muslims and Christians. The academy’s presentation of the Islamic and Christian worlds as enemies has thus been so deeply ingrained in our consciousness that we are unable to recognize it as the foundation of our modern conception of Islam as dangerous, hostile, and unmodern.
Abdesselam Cheddadi,17 professor of history at the University of Rabat, Morocco, next discussed the question of historical memory and asked how it should be approached at both local and global levels in Western and Muslim societies. Historical memory is an essential element of each culture and draws on a canon of texts that apply to the past, present, and future. Moreover, it is expressed through theology, mythology, philosophy, and history. Cheddadi argued that historical memory operates on several levels; it functions, in part, as an ideology or way of organizing thinking and reality. History is used to construct a version of events that is accepted as true and immutable but, in fact, freezes what should be a fluid social process. History, therefore, becomes naturally and inherently conservative. Historical memory is also vital for the formation of societal identity, but risks imposing a literalist interpretation of the past. Ibn Khaldun, the great fourteenth century historian of Muslim societies, for example, sought to uncover society’s laws and to understand the internal rhythms of a community. Yet even as he is celebrated as a great historian of the Muslim world, contemporary historians have distorted his approach. First, in trying to follow an Islamic vision, Islamist historians do not take social realities into account. Second, it must be recognized that Islamist history is inevitably exclusionist, emphasizing “Islamic” tradition, with the broader social milieu ignored. Ibn Khaldun reminds us that histories that derive their authority from revelation and “truth” are problematic. The challenge for the future, then, is how to create a just, nuanced scholarship to overcome these regressive tendencies.
Hassan Hanafi, 18 professor of philosophy, University of Cairo, Egypt, the session’s third panelist, discussed the difference between using history and reading history. He argued that one of the major problems with history is that it is often misused and falsified, and he cautioned against overstating the influence of the West. One of the problems of Western scholarship, according to Hanafi, is that it fails to understand that modernism too, comes out of tradition. Therefore, easy dichotomies like “Islam and the West” or “modernity and tradition” must be imploded. Hanafi claimed that there exists a universal code of ethics, a set of normative guidelines that apply on both shores of the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, individuals and societies around the world suffer the consequences of impersonal, globalizing forces. Likewise, “unhelpful” Western ideologies have posited the West’s ultimate victory and the resultant End of History. The reality, however, is more complex. Muslims perceive the West as acting on double standards. In Muslim societies, many people experience feelings of inferiority and it remains unclear what role minority groups can play and whether civil society will evolve as an alternative to the current state structure. Hanafi went on to discuss the obsession with economics underlying current rhetoric and political models. Minority and human rights, gender issues, and social fragmentation are all masked by the world’s focus on profit. Ideas such as the End of History and the Clash of Civilizations hide the possibility that we could be witnessing the beginning of a new civilizational upheaval, comparable in its effect on global affairs to World War II. As Hanafi sees it, in our current economics-oriented mode, power is granted to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, organizations that divide the world into center and periphery to dismantle weaker nations in the name of “prosperity.” This division taints our perception of the Other in both the Islamic and Western worlds. Westerners view those south of the Mediterranean as backward, poor, ignorant, and supportive of terrorists. Similarly, many Muslims have appropriated notions of Westerners as materialistic, secular, egoist, hypercritical, and nihilistic. How can we, Hanafi asked, erase these DIAimages, which shape our views and limit our communication? We must, above all, remember that history is cyclical and that justice, not power, should be the global norm.
As commentator, James Piscatori 19 extrapolated from these presentations several functions of history. First, history can be seen as the filter through which one’s place in the world is defined. History contributes to the mythology of a society, such as the Pilgrims’ place in the American imagination or Andalusia in the Spanish national consciousness. Second, history legitimizes the interests of groups and governments and mobilizes support. These same interests, however, are framed and at times defined by cultural parameters. While this is not to suggest that there are ingrained civilizational differences, it is clear that Muslim political positions on Palestine and Kashmir, for example, have much to do with solidarity with other Muslim nations. Third, history can be conceived in terms of the search for authenticity, which carries the connotation of taking control of one’s own cultural destiny. Perhaps this quest is inevitably exclusionary, however. Women, for example, tend to be written out of history for a variety of reasons. The result is that what was meant to be an empowering interpretation of history might end up reaffirming traditional social and political hierarchies. Finally, history is important as a source of perspective; history informs our understanding of daily life and often connects people across societies. While this may seem a neutral process, time and culture influence even the “facts” of history and histories themselves often have hidden agendas.
In the ensuing discussion, one participant made the point that the general understanding of Islam depends on what is emphasized in histories. If, for example, greater attention were given to Sufism or the millet 20 system of the Ottoman Empire or Jadidism, 21 different perspectives would result and Islam would appear more moderate. Other participants argued that Islam emerges from a wide variety of specific situations and contacts, which, if better understood, would help avoid the reductionist view that Islam is inevitably “this” or “that.” Modernism, as well, is a specific way of seeing history. One speaker asked that modernity be defined. Another suggested that due to the current power structure, the writing of grand narratives could end up encouraging hegemonic thinking. On the other hand, a rethinking of history might generate the possibility that Islam and the West are actually two parts of the same civilization. Others suggested that we may instead need more focused topical histories, concentrating on themes like poverty, gender, and minority status rather than on religions. In summary, participants appreciated that while history can be easily manipulated and controlled, it can also be defining. The challenge is how to recognize this fact without being trapped into essentialized readings of one another’s traditions.
While it was deemed necessary to move on from considering the broad intellectual framework of the discussion toward a more disciplined focus on particular issues, there was no overall consensus among the participants in this working group about the subject of discussion, namely political Islam and its relations with the West. As one speaker put it: “There remain problems of conceptualizing the fields of research, exchange and action on which we are required to contribute.” Relations between Islam and the West, and the question of “who speaks for Islam,” the subject of the previous days’ debate, should be discussed not only between Muslims, but also in the wider community of historians, anthropologists, and others. According to this view, it was religion itself, rather than Islam, that needed to be explored. Not only must the whole issue of Islam be rethought; an entirely new approach to the study of religious phenomena must be adopted to take into account Western monotheism and the history of theological systems as they developed in the Mediterranean basin. Dialogues must unlearn and abandon the idea of speaking about “political Islam” as a category distinct from the broader role that religions play in nurturing modern radicalisms.
Echoing views previously aired during the plenary sessions, several speakers felt that the very choice of headings involved an absence of balance necessary to a conversation between equal parties, with Islam and Islamist movements being the objects of concern or improvement. Western policies had been imposed unilaterally, without consultation. How can Muslims influence change? According to this view the bipolar vision implied by such phrases as “Islam and the West” and “North and South” needs to be transcended. While perceiving things in terms of such crude categories might have been acceptable in 1967 or even after the Iranian revolution in 1979, later events have taken the world beyond such polarities. In several Muslim countries, Islamist parties are already participating in parliamentary institutions. Dialogues needs a comparative framework in which religiously affiliated movements, including Jewish and Christian fundamentalisms, can be measured against the rise of right-wing parties in Europe. Why must all Islamist parties be tarred with the label of anti-Westernism, while many are in fact engaged in constructive dialogue with Western governments?
One speaker felt that the idea of dialogues could be taken forward by an exploration of common cultural ground or mutualities. Another insisted that in any future engagements between the West and Islamist movements—an engagement considered inevitable by many speakers—priority should be given to democratic principles: there could be no discussion with parties holding to fascist ideologies, which the speaker defined as giving priority to restoring the shari’ah, the Muslim code of religious law. Other speakers, however, saw no conflict between the agenda of Islamist parties and democracy—elections in several Muslim countries had been conducted fairly. Excessive concern about the “Islamic menace” was itself undemocratic. The danger posed by political Islam has been exaggerated.
Another speaker addressed the issue of the practicalities of democracy, pointing out that in some Western countries, electoral procedures were far from flawless. A workshop should be held with participants from various Islamist tendencies invited to discuss electoral issues like the mechanics of voting, the role of political parties involved in the process, and controls over the nomination of candidates. Wider political concerns, including the fear that winners would derail the electoral system when in power, should also be addressed. It is jumhuriyyah (republic) rather than imarah (Islamic leadership) that needs encouragement.
In his concluding remarks, the chair of the first working group argued against the Clash of Civilizations thesis, maintaining that the broader aims of Islam and democracy are fully compatible. Speaking of the Arab world in particular, he observed that in none of twenty-two Arab countries, however, could political sovereignty be said to belong to the people in line with Islamic teachings. Few nations hold truly free elections where the people exercise freedom of choice. Marxist rule and political pluralism have been tried with mixed results. Why could a further effort not be made to develop Muslim societies in line with their own traditions? The existing national state has been overdependent on foreign powers. Islamic discourse has proved a good tool for mediating social contests. The legitimization of Islamic movements is another imperative; many are currently forced underground and in some countries, even moderate groups are subject to police repression. In some cases, Islamists who “repented” and renounced violence were still harassed by police after being released from prison. The chair concluded, “It is time to go beyond what we have inherited during the past four decades. We must look towards a new world system.”
In the second working group, the issues of political accountability and good governance were addressed. What are the dangers and limitations inherent in promoting democracy? Is it even the business of the West to promote democracy in the Muslim world? What are the “rules of the game”? How do we overcome anxieties that one party would manipulate the system to its advantage? How do we establish political order on an equitable basis, ensuring a system that is “interactive” and “open to all”? One theme to emerge clearly in the discussion was that responsive governance must be permitted to develop locally, that recipes or prescriptions imposed by the West would fail. Attention should rather focus on examples of full citizen participation and pluralism. Outside intervention should be avoided, with local people making their own decisions. Rulers sustained by and accountable to foreign governments generally fail to gain support among their own people. The same logic applies to projects funded from abroad.
A second theme to emerge was that governance could not be considered without taking account of gender. To whom are rulers accountable if not to at least the female half of their populations? New thinking is needed about gender, and theories that pit women against men should be avoided. Moreover, it was noted that increasing the representation of women in parliaments would not automatically rectify gender imbalances.
Several speakers drew attention to how unequal control of media and communications has led to mutual misperceptions between the Islamic and Western worlds. On the other hand, as one participant pointed out, Western television networks are not so much deliberately hostile to Islam and Muslims as glaringly and generally superficial. There should be a follow-up workshop to address the DIAimages and clichés responsible for many of the current misperceptions between the Islamic and Western worlds. Another practical suggestion was to explore the idea of a “Global C-Span”-type channel, on which the best material from different parts of the world, including (for example) soap operas from Muslim countries, would be shown. One speaker pointed to the “dismal” quality of Arab television, while mentioning the recent United Nations report on Human Development in the Arab World, which drew attention to the paucity of foreign books being translated into Arabic as compared to Greek and Spanish. One response was that the cultural situation in Arab lands has been disadvantaged by the suppression of the medieval Arab legacy of free thought and intelligent debate. Efforts should be made to distribute books about classical Arab civilization.
A further suggestion was for a follow-up workshop on media representation, which would not only examine the way in which Islam and Muslims are represented in the Western media, and vice versa, but look more broadly at the ways in which politics and culture in Islamic societies are transformed by media DIAimages. The atrocity of 9/11, broadcast all over the world, was a media event par excellence, while for suicide bombers, the videotaping of valedictory statements provides an incentive to death and martyrdom. Three categories of media would need to be investigated: news, entertainment, and education.
The issue of corruption was addressed somewhat briefly, with one speaker pointing out that the responsibility lay with Western governments and businesses, since arms commissions and other bribes have found their way into Western banks. Another speaker pointed out, however, that in contrast to China where investment was being nurtured by funds from the Chinese Diaspora, Arabs and Iranians were liable to keep their funds abroad, exhibiting a lack of confidence in the economies of their own societies.
In her concluding statement, the chair of the second working group argued that Dialogues must attempt to bring in new partners. Participation should be open to all those willing to attend, without exclusion. The program should foster an interactive process, encouraging networking between individuals. Participants should share their positive experiences, with the emphasis placed on options rather than dictums, and avoiding prescriptive solutions. Guidance, not intervention, should be the watchword.
The issue of women and gender must be addressed, but with sensitivity. Women should be empowered within the context of their respective cultures. The empowerment of women is closely bound up with the question of accountability. Women “occupy half the planet,” but many still do not possess identity cards enabling them to vote, and where they have been allowed to participate in elections, they have sometimes shown where to put their fingers on the voting sheets. The matter of gender should be viewed without “cosmetics.”
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