Islam and Elections

2004 Report (Continued)


Session III- Pluralism Versus Islam, and Pluralism within Islam

In light of current debates about the democratization of the Muslim world, can pluralism function within Islam or are the two antithetical? Participants were asked to consider existing divisions within Islam as a religion, taking into account whether, in a pluralistic system, different groups (defined by political affiliation, gender, ethnicity, occupation, etc.) should be guaranteed representation, freedom of expression, and/or access to elections.

Marina Ottaway, Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who moderated the session, began by drawing the participants’ attention to four points which, in her view, go to the heart of the discussion on pluralism and Islam. First, she noted that one of the central characteristics of elections is the fostering of unfettered political competition. However, allowing free competition means accepting the legitimacy of different viewpoints, which, in turn, entails moving away from the assumption that there is an “absolute truth” to be determined. That is, the notion of “what is good” becomes relative, and this has always been a point of contention for religion, which by its very nature deals with absolute values. Historically, a solution was found in the concept of separating what has been called “the city of man” from “the kingdom of God,” i.e., the Western secularist ideal of the separation of church and state. Is such a solution acceptable in Islam, and if not, then what are the prospects for pluralism in Islam?

Second, she noted that even within some pluralistic states, a “red line” may be drawn to exclude some points of view that are regarded as unacceptable. For example, political parties or groups advocating racial supremacy and hatred are excluded from political participation in many democratic countries. The question is thus, where is the red line in the context of our discussion on elections, democracy, human rights, and Islam?

Third, she called the session’s attention to a more practical problem regarding the functioning of pluralistic political systems based on elections. For elections to work, the political spectrum cannot be too broad, because it requires unsuccessful parties to accept the legitimacy of the government that wins the elections. (This is clearly more difficult if the parties’ positions are so far apart that there is no core consensus.) Given the complicated and diverse makeup of the Muslim world, can such a consensus be found?

Finally, she stressed that the experience of countries with functioning competitive political systems shows that the key participants are those whose views change from election to election. If the electorate was to maintain absolute fidelity to particular parties or ideologies, this would result in permanent majorities and minorities, which can fuel resentment and stifle progress. This problem is more pronounced where parties run on ethnic or religious platforms. Some states, such as Nigeria, have therefore banned parties organized along such lines. How should the delineation of political parties come into play in the discussion on Islam and pluralism?

Essam El-Eryan opened the floor by stating that the starting point should be the question of whether Islam accepts constitutional and parliamentary systems. Drawing on the views of the late Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, he concluded that constitutional and parliamentary systems of government could be considered to be the closest to Islam.5 This position, he argued, was reflected in a Brotherhood publication that advocated pluralism within a Muslim society as a requirement for a just society.6 He added that Islamic political parties are civil, not religious parties, and on that basis their membership is open to all sectors of society without exception. He also contested the view that the idea of an “absolute truth” presents a barrier to pluralism. This view, he submitted, derives from the particular historical experiences of Europe and its struggle with the church, precipitating a secularist ideal that should not be generalized to the Muslim world. Islam has always allowed for flexibility and varying interpretations within the framework of “an absolute truth,” which provides the core of belief. He cited the example of the Islamic Republic of Iran, where there exists a multitude of political parties. He stated, in conclusion, that pluralism in Muslim countries can function within a religious framework which assumes on the one hand that the majority of the population is Muslim and that religion therefore cannot be divorced from everyday life, but on the other hand recognizes the rights of non-Muslim minorities and considers them citizens of the state regardless of their religion. Special constitutional provisions can be enacted to protect the interests of these minorities and guarantee their rights and freedoms.

Mahmoud Al-Sartawi agreed that pluralism did not need a secular framework in order to operate. He gave the example of the Sahifa, or Constitution of Medina, drafted by the Prophet Muhammad upon the establishment of the first Islamic state. This document served as a social compact regulating relations between citizens of different beliefs and could be a useful precedent for today in both Muslim and non-Muslim states; we can draw from it the conclusion that what befalls non-Muslims in a Muslim state could befall their Muslim brothers in non-Muslim countries, he explained.

Abdel-Monem Abul Futuh agreed with Mahmoud Al-Sartawi and with the view that secularism as practiced in the West cannot be applied to the Muslim world. The rules governing any society must reflect its value system and historical experience. All societies, whether Islamic, Christian, Jewish, or Hindu, have specificities. Muslims, for their part, believe that Islam is a religion that is not confined to matters of personal faith and worship. Rather it is an all-encompassing value system that regulates every aspect of human existence, including the political. For this reason, there can be no separation between religion and state. Indeed, as stipulated by classical Islamic legal and political thought, the state exists to manifest the will of God as reflected in the religion and is consequently accountable to the people in its accomplishment of this mission. Therefore, Abul Futuh continued, if the majority of the people are Muslims and accept Islamic rules and culture as their governance, then democracy itself dictates that this choice should be respected, including in the West—whether or not the Islamic government corresponds to particular Western ideas of democracy—since what matters is that this government reflects the will of the people.

Ghazi Suliman concurred that pluralism has been an Islamic ideal since the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Be this as it may, he disagreed with the previous speaker and urged participants to address the contemporary realities of the Muslim world, where notions of pluralism and justice, whether derived from Islam or from Western political thought, are continually thwarted and abused. The majority of Muslims continue to suffer under oppressive authoritarian regimes that abuse their peoples’ most basic human rights. Moreover, Islam is continually used to legitimize the oppressive practices of such governments, precisely because there is no universal Islamic consensus as to the religion’s exact laws or their application. Khalid Al-Mubarak asserted that if such a consensus could be reached, differentiating between religion and the state could still protect the integrity of the religion from the vicissitudes of the state.

In agreement with Al-Mubarak, Ghazi Suliman argued that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women provide clear standards to ensure the dignity of all human beings. These agreements do not fundamentally contradict the central message of Islam, which is, in its temporal sense, essentially humanitarian. If powers, Islamic or otherwise, want to show that they have democratic ideals and principles, they need to show tangible respect for these universal values. Along with other participants, however, Suliman accepted that there may be areas of conflict between some specific rulings contained in classical Islamic law and human rights requirements for good governance. He gave the example of the specific corporal punishments (hudud) stipulated in the Qur’an; these have been applied to varying degrees in several parts of the Muslim world, including in Sudan since 1983. The blanket application of such laws in a country as ethnically and religiously diverse as Sudan has had devastating consequences, threatening the territorial integrity of the nation and eroding prospects for peace, pluralism, and democracy. Suliman added that as a Muslim, he could not oppose the theoretical notion that God is ultimately the Supreme Legislator. However, in organizing earthly affairs, it is the duty of humankind to determine and apply the law within specific contexts. Given the social, political, and cultural differences that exist between and within nations, universal human rights, in Suliman’s estimation, provide a basic minimum standard that does not contradict Islam. He reasserted the view of a large number of participants, that given today’s reality, there can be no single model of an Islamic state. On the contrary, there are as many forms of government as Muslim countries, each with particular requirements and experiences.

In this regard, Fatima Gailani observed that the degree to which people consider themselves Muslim has little to do with whether or not they live in a country that calls itself Islamic, or even has an Islamic constitution. What is of concern to all populations is whether their individual rights, as they define them, are recognized and respected by their governments. She drew examples from her experience in Afghanistan, explaining that the majority of the population wants a just and pluralistic system of governance that addresses their very real and pressing social and economic needs. However, given recent events in that country, she continued, many Afghans would regard a secular constitution—one, for example, that allowed for a non-Muslim to be head of state—with great suspicion. This may or may not have much to do with actual Islamic rules of government, but it does relate to the experiences of the Afghan people, she submitted.

Humam Hamoudi agreed with Gailani and, given the example of Iraq, argued that the previous regime’s repression of ethnic and religious groups (primarily the Shi‘a population) has led to extreme sensitivity and increasing sectarianism as each group now tries to reinscribe its identity. The new Iraqi constitution, therefore, must recognize this diversity while preserving the unity of Iraq as a whole. Hamoudi cautioned that imposing secularism too hastily is dangerous, precisely because it leads to accusations of adopting values imposed by the West.

Mohammed Abdullahi Abubaker, electoral commissioner of the Independent National Electoral Commission of Nigeria, explained that in the case of Nigeria—a federal state comprising 350 ethnic groups with distinct languages, religions, and cultures—a secular constitution that respects the existence of the two main religions (namely, Islam and Christianity) and that safeguards the rights of all minority groups is the only viable political system. In order to function effectively, he maintained, pluralism in Nigeria is bolstered by a ban on religious political parties as well as by a legal system that includes customary, Islamic, and common law courts, each with distinct jurisdictions.

The Nigerian and, to some extent, Malaysian examples may demonstrate that Islam and Islamic values can be adopted within a system that does not necessarily bear the “Islamic” label. Many participants felt that if such a system accords respect to Islamic principles as agreed upon by the majority of the population, there should be no grounds for accusations that the system is “Western” or “imposed by the West.” However, it was felt that the system must also deal equitably with other religions in order to ensure citizens’ peaceful coexistence. Nevertheless, with reference to Nigeria, concern was expressed by some participants regarding the case of Amina Lawal, a young mother recently convicted for adultery and sentenced to death by stoning.7 The punishment was ostensibly based on a strict interpretation of Islamic law (shari‘a), although there is no mention of stoning to death as a penalty for adultery in the Qur’an itself.

Participants then discussed the question of the immutability of religious laws in Islam. Mohsen Kadivar, Iranian Shi‘ite cleric and political analyst, declared that elections are a reasonable way to manage politics and involve society, and that Islam encourages every reasonable method. However, returning to the issue of “red lines,” he stressed the need to determine the limits with regard to what is permissible within Islam. He explained that there broadly exist two strands of interpretation in Islam today, one “modern” and the other “traditional.” The first strand seeks to review existing Islamic law and practice by returning to primary Islamic sources (the Qur’an above all, but also the sunna) and introducing new interpretations of the religious law (ijtihad) that are in line with the ideals of accountability, pluralism, and human rights.8 The second strand, which holds to traditional interpretations of Islam, does indeed express clear “red lines,” or limits, on equality. For example, these traditionalists do not consider Muslims and non-Muslims equal, nor men and women, and do not object to slavery. He cautioned that participants must therefore be clear, when speaking about Islam, to which of the two strands they are referring. It is obvious that Islamic traditionalists cannot deliver a pluralistic society where all are considered equal in rights and obligations. He added, however, that many of the barriers to pluralism in the Muslim world are cultural and have little to do with Islam itself, regardless of which strand of interpretation one considers.

Some participants agreed that there is a need to interpret Islamic laws and principles within the framework of the spirit of Islam—what is referred to in Islamic jurisprudence as maqasid al-shari‘a.9 This concept requires that exegesis move beyond strict traditional and literalist interpretations to a search of the true meaning of Islam. The discussion did not address, however, the exact boundaries distinguishing “traditional” interpretations of Islam from “modern” reformulations.

Mohammed Charfi gave the example of practices that are considered “Islamic,” and for which Muslim societies are often faulted, such as death by stoning in cases of adultery and the imposition of the death penalty for apostasy. Regarding stoning, he reiterated that the Qur’an does not in any way stipulate, or even mention, stoning as a penalty for adultery. However, the historical practice is recorded in classical Islamic law manuals; traditional Muslim thinkers therefore consider it part of God’s immutable law and have reintroduced it into the criminal law codes of many Muslim countries. Charfi cited Iranian criminal law, which details the manner by which stoning is to be conducted, insisting that small stones are used in order to maximize suffering and prolong the agony of the adulterer. He denounced this archaic and barbaric practice as a form of torture, which is categorically prohibited by Islam and violates the religion’s emphasis on mercy and forgiveness. In the case of apostasy, Charfi drew attention to the fact that the Qur’an does not stipulate death for those who choose to leave the religion. (This was, in fact, practiced by Christians during the Crusades.) Rather, the Qur’an clearly states that there can be no compulsion in religion.10 Muslims are free to accept or reject Islam; belief is between the individual and God and cannot be regulated by temporal sanctions. Charfi added that the Qur’an describes itself as completely free from mistake or omission. How then can oppressive practices that have no basis in the Qur’an be considered Islamic? In conclusion, he observed that the stoning of adulterers and execution of apostates were adopted by Islamic peoples based on local cultures and contexts in contravention of central Islamic principles. The fact that almost all the victims of stoning in the Muslim world are women shows the extent to which the practice is linked to traditional patriarchal codes of honor rather than to Islam itself.

Throughout the session, many references were made to history and its many functions: it not only informs and shapes the present, but also teaches lessons that must be utilized in any forward-thinking strategy. Participants stated that although Muslims and Islamic civilization must be recognized for their extensive contributions to human progress, Muslims can no longer simply rely on the high points of their past when confronted with contemporary challenges.

Humam Hamoudi concurred with Mohammed Charfi and various others, pointing to proud moments in Islamic history at which pluralistic and just ideals were adopted. Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab, for example, was praised for his defense of the rights of minorities and other vulnerable social groups. Such examples must be translated into modern structures and institutions, rather than solely serving as historical evidence of the existence of virtuous Islamic leaders and individuals of high moral standing. Participants stressed that the ideal of democracy and justice, whether in Islam or countries elsewhere, requires significant institutional guarantees, which are more effective in ensuring good governance than mere reliance on the virtue of the ruler.

In the case of protection of minorities’ rights, Syed Shahabuddin insisted that the traditional Islamic system of protecting religious minorities (ahl al-dhimma) is not adequate in the modern world.11 According to classical Islamic law and thought, non-Muslims in a Muslim state are accorded a special protected status—but not equality. Shahabuddin reminded participants that as a Muslim-minority citizen in India, a non-Muslim state, this is an important distinction for him. He demanded to be an equal citizen in India and stated that only as such can his rights and interests as a member of a minority religious community be fully guaranteed. He added that Muslims iving in non-Muslim states form a significant proportion of the world’s total Muslim population. Their desire to be equal citizens must be acknowledged by those formulating Islamic laws both within and outside the Muslim world so that there can be reciprocity. While some disagreed, arguing that each country should enact laws that reflect its own social and cultural requirements, Shahabuddin maintained that we all live in a global community; we cannot expect Muslims in the non-Muslim world to be treated differently than non-Muslims are treated in a Muslim state.

Khalid Al-Mubarak acknowledged that on questions of the protection of minorities, or dhimmi status, theory has not always translated into practice. In Egypt, he asserted, there are historical cases of oppression of minorities despite classical Islamic rules on the just treatment of dhimmis. In other instances, however, the rights of non-Muslims were fully promoted and even extended beyond the classical legal requirements. There are two sides to history, he concluded—a glorious one, attested to by the conduct of Umar ibn al-Khattab, and a less glorious one—which is precisely why practical and institutional guarantees, which transcend the goodwill of rulers, are required.

In conclusion, the participants agreed that there is no essential conflict between Islam and pluralism. Diversity and pluralism, as pointed out by Syed Shahabuddin and others, are plainly reflected in Islamic history and thought.12 However, participants recognized that important institutional guarantees were required to make pluralism fully operative in Muslim societies. Many also affirmed the relevance of context, particularly in relation to pluralism and the rise of sectarian conflict and factionalism.

There was little consensus on limits to pluralism, or on the question of separation of religion and the state as a guarantee for pluralism in the Muslim world. It was unanimously recognized that various interpretations of Islam exist in the Muslim world and that some of these interpretations may limit the scope of pluralism.

Some participants welcomed the idea of an Islamic democracy that would respect pluralism, the rights of citizens, the principle of peaceful transfer of power, and so on, but insisted that such a democracy, above all else, had to be true to Islamic principles. Others questioned whether an Islamic democracy would, in practice, seek to develop the democratic ideal and truly promote the synthesis of Islamic jurisprudence and human rights. There was also no agreement as to whether secular models of human rights would be adequate for or even accepted by the Muslim world.

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© 2006, The Center for Dialogues: Islamic World - U.S. - The West

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