Notes to Appendix V

1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

2. The term salaf can be translated as the “revered ancestors.” The main thrust of salafi thought is its advocacy for the return to the pristine form of Islam practiced by the first generation of Muslims. This is seen as the ideal from which later generations of Muslims have deviated, leading to Islam’s and Muslims’ decline.

3. Khaled Abou El Fadl, “The Place of Tolerance in Islam,” Boston Review, December 2001/January 2002, online at http://bostonreview.net/ BR26.6/elfadl. html.

4. The schism within Islam that resulted in the two grand families of Islamic faith (the majority Sunni and the minority Shia) came about in the early years following the Prophet Muhammad’s death. In 657 the notables of Medina selected Ali ibn Abu Talib, cousin and son–in–law of the Prophet, as the fourth caliph. However, Muawiya, the Umayyad governor of Syria who had been appointed by Uthman, Ali’s predecessor as caliph, refused to recognize Ali’s authority. Those who sided with Ali became known as the Shia (partisans of Ali). The majority who accepted Muawiya’s rule as legitimate became known as the Sunni. For a detailed rendering of the intricate set of events that led up to the Sunni–Shia division, see Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, Volume 1: The Classical Age of Islam, reprint edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 276–79.

5. L. Carl Brown, Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 54.

6. Barbara Rosewicz, “Prestigious Al Azhar is Force of Moderation,” Wall Street Journal, August 10, 1987.

7. Mona El–Nahhas, “A confusing fatwa,” Al–Ahram Weekly, September 4–10, 2003, online at http://weekly. ahram.org.eg/2003/654/eg6.htm.

8. Rosewicz, “Prestigious Al Azhar Is Force of Moderation.”

9. The Oxford English Dictionary Online (www.oed.com) defines fundamentalism as “strict adherence to ancient or fundamental doctrines, with no concessions to modern developments in thought or customs.” For an argument that a reformation has already taken place in Islam with the emergence of scriptural fundamentalism and “priesthood of the individual,” two fundamental features of the Christian Reformation, see Carl W. Ernst, Following Muhammad: Rethinking Islam in the Contemporary World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), pp. 66–67.

10. The Mandate system was established by the League of Nations following World War I to provide for the administration of former Ottoman territories and German colonies in the Middle East, Africa, and the Pacific. The Ottoman territories were divided among the European Allies, who were granted supervision over these lands as a precursor to eventual independence. In the Middle East, five new Mandates were created from the former Ottoman territories: Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine were British Mandates, while Syria and Lebanon were administered by France.

11. The Peace of Westphalia, embodied in a series of treaties signed in 1648, marked the end of Europe’s bloody 30 Years War and the birth of the modern state system. The Peace of Westphalia abolished the unity of the Holy Roman Empire and enshrined into treaty law the doctrine that the religion of the ruler is the religion of the state and no state could force another to change its religion. Subsequently, national interests began to trump religion as the basis for disputes among European states.

12. Rudolph Peters, Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History (The Hague: Mouton, 1979).

13. Khaled Abou El Fadl, “Islam and the Challenge of Democracy,” Boston Review, April/May 2003, online at http://bostonreview.net/BR28.2/abou.html.

14. For details about the working of the OIC and other international Muslim organizations, see Saad S. Khan, Reasserting International Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

15. According to Sadik Al–Azm, “Bin Laden may be seen as a more dangerous, advanced, and global version of Juhaiman al–Utaibi. While Juhaiman directed his desperate, spectacular intervention against the most important local legitimizing symbol of the Saudi system, bin Laden attacked the American core without which the local system could not possibly survive.” Sadik J. Al–Azm, “Time Out of Joint,” Boston Review, October/November 2004, online at www.bostonreview.net/BR29.5/alazm.html.

16. See Gregory Gause, “Kingdom in the Middle: Saudi Arabia’s Double Game,” in James F. Hoge, Jr., and Gideon Rose, eds., How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), pp. 109–122; and Eric Rouleau, “Trouble in the Kingdom,” Foreign Affairs, 81(4), July–August 2002, pp. 75–89.

17. Ijtihad can be defined as the exercise of independent reasoning by jurists to apply the shari’a to legal questions arising from circumstances that are not covered by the Qur’an, sunnah, established precedent, or direct analogy.

18. Nikki Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), chapters 9 and 10.

19. Daniel Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), pp. 135–36.

20. See, inter alia, Jean–Michel Cadiot, “Tehran and Washington a Step Closer Through Afghanistan,” Agence France Presse, October 7, 2001; Nazila Fathi, “On the Sly, Iran Weighs Closer Ties With U.S.,” New York Times, November 9, 2001; Thomas L. Friedman, “The View from Tehran,” New York Times, June 26, 2002; Seymour M. Hersh, “The Iran Game: How Will Tehran’s Nuclear Ambitions Affect Our Budding Partnership?” New Yorker, December 3, 2001.

21. “Government Urged to Get Tough in Territory Dispute,” Jakarta Post, March 7, 2005, online at www.thejakartapost.com/detaillatestnews.asp?fileid=20050307181600&irec=2.

22. Quoted in Farrah Naz Karrim, “Resolve Issue Through Talks,” New Straits Times, March 9, 2005.

23. Quoted in John L. Esposito, “Muhammad Iqbal and the Islamic State,” in John L. Esposito, ed., Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 187.

24. Saeed Abdullah, “The Official Ulama and the Religious Legitimacy of the Modern Nation State,” in S. Akbarzadeh and A. Saeed, eds., Islam and Political Legitimacy (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 14–15.

25. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “Mawdudi and the Jamat–i–Islami,” in Ali Rahnema, ed., Pioneers of Islamic Revival (London: Zed Books, 1994), p. 105.

26. Charles Tripp, “Sayyid Qutb: The Political Vision,” in Ali Rahnema, ed., Pioneers of Islamic Revival, p. 178.

27. Incidentally, the same is true of Osama bin Laden, who was trained as an engineer, and his deputy, Ayman al–Zawahiri, who was trained as a physician.

28. For analyses of Sayyid Qutb’s ideas, see Yvonne Haddad, “Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival,” in John L. Esposito, ed., Voices of Resurgent Islam and Charles Tripp, “Sayyid Qutb: The Political Vision,” in Ali Rahnema, ed., Pioneers of Islamic Revival.

29. Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. vii.

30. For a discussion of the model of the “strangers” and the model of the “ancestors,” see Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament, second edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 242.

31. For details of this argument, see Mohammed Ayoob, “Political Islam: Image and Reality,” World Policy Journal, Fall 2004, p3.

32. For Egypt, see Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); for Turkey, see Jenny White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003).

33. Husain Haqqani, “Islam’s Medieval Outposts,” Foreign Policy, November–December 2002, pp. 58–64.

34. For the Chechen case that bears out this thesis, see C. J. Chivers and Steven Lee Myers, “Chechen Rebels Mainly Driven by Nationalism,” New York Times, September 12, 2004.

35. For Hamas and Hezbollah, see respectively Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), and Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004).

36. See Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt; Jenny White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey; Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama’at–I–Islami of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); and Robert W. Heffner, Civil Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

37. Ihsan D. Dagi, “Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post–Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey,” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, 13(2), Summer 2004, p. 140. See also Mohammed Ayoob, “Turkey’s Multiple Paradoxes,” Orbis, Summer 2004, pp. 451–463.

38. Joshua A. Stacher, “Post–Islamist Rumblings in Egypt: The Emergence of the Wasat Party,” Middle East Journal, 56(3), Summer 2002, pp. 415–432.

39. The term “network of networks” is borrowed from Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003), p. 16.

40. Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim (New York: Pantheon, 2004).

41. Ibid.

42. Susan Sachs, “A Muslim Missionary Group Draws New Scrutiny in U.S.,” New York Times, July 14, 2003.

43. Sachs, “A Muslim Missionary Group Draws New Scrutiny in U.S.,” and Craig S. Smith, “French Islamic Group Offers Rich Soil for Militancy,” International Herald Tribune, April 29, 2005.

44. L. Carl Brown, Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 95.

45. For Sir Sayyid’s ideas, see Christian W. Troll, Sayyid Ahmad Khan: A Reinterpretation of Muslim Theology (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978).

46. Nikki R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal al–Din “al–Afghani” (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 173.

47. L. Carl Brown, Religion and State, pp. 93–98.

48. Suha Taji–Farouki, ed., Modern Muslim Intellectuals and the Qur’an (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

49. For a more in–depth exploration of these thinkers, see, inter alia, Suha Taji–Farouki, ed., Modern Muslim Intellectuals and the Qur’an; Rachid Benzine, Les nouveaux penseurs de l’Islam (Paris: Albin Michel, 2004); Fazlur Rahman and Ebrahim Moosa, eds., Revival and Reform in Islam (Oxford: Oneworld, 1999); Ronald Nettler, “Mohamed Talbi’s Ideas on Islam and Politics: A Conception of Islam for the Modern World,” in J. Cooper, R. Nettler, and M. Mahmoud, eds., Islam and Modernity (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000), p. 131; Abdelmajid Charfi, Islam entre le Message et l’Histoire (Paris: Albin Michel, 2004); Mohammed Arkoun, Rethinking Islam: Common Questions, Uncommon Answers, trans. Robert D. Lee (Boulder: Perseus, 1994), The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought (London: Saqi Books, 2002); Abdullahi An–Naim, Toward an Islamic Reformation (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990); and Amina Wadud, Qur’an and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

50. Deborah Sontag, “Mystery of the Islamic Scholar Who Was Barred by the U.S.,” New York Times, October 6, 2004.

51. Gary Bunt, Islam in the Digital Age (London: Pluto Press, 2003), p. 141.

52. See Jean Lacouture, Ghassan Tuéni, and Gérard D. Khoury, Un siècle pour rien: Le Moyen–Orient arabe de l’Empire ottoman à l’Empire américain (Paris: Albin Michel, 2002).

53. See, for example, the Arab Human Development Reports, published by the United Nations Development Programme.

54. See Maria Rosa Menocal, The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain (New York: Little, Brown, 2002).


Back to the top.

© 2006, The Center for Dialogues: Islamic World - U.S. - The West

Site Map

Site by Bianchi